On Monday morning, I return to work after what has been a wonderful Christmas break. The giving and receiving of presents is always a particular highlight and thankfully, I am easy to shop for, an item of British First World War militaria or a military history book is always welcome. This year, I was extremely fortunate to receive some wonderful gifts, albeit those who don’t understand my proclivities might easily believe my presents had come from either a car boot sale or a second-hand shop! My favourite gift is an original First World War Verners Mark VII marching compass in full working order in its issued leather case. The individual to whom it was originally handed had scratched their details into the leather of the case, unfortunately try as I might I cannot read the lettering.
As I opened the ancient case and examined the compass, I was transfixed by the instrument, its heavy brass construction designed to last, the aluminium parts painted to avoid a flash of shine, and the Mother-of-Pearl dial, beautifully detailed to allow easier reading of the compass on a moonlit night. I held in my hands a cutting edge piece of early-20th century instrumentation; designed only twenty years before the War, it would have represented real precision on the battlefields of the Great War. I thought about the fact that most major attacks during the War were conducted in daylight and, thinking about my own experiences navigating in France and Belgium at night, understood the complexity of navigation for our very recent ancestors. Today navigation is as simple as turning on a smart phone and following triangulated GPS signals, very much easier than for our forgotten navigator of the Great War. For all its beauty and practicality, my 1915 compass is, although usable, almost obsolete, its utility beaten by my the march of time.
A little before Christmas, I found myself embroiled in an annoying Twitter spat with several Militweeters regarding the utility of allowing Other Ranks to access Professional Military Education (PME). Their argument was that, at a time of austerity, spending money on granting soldiers access to the sort of PME currently reserved for Officers was wasteful and unwarranted. They argued that soldiers already received sufficient PME informally or through the Command, Leadership and Management courses required for promotion and that to add further knowledge would be pointless. Soldiers knew what they needed to know for their role. This, and the Defence Academy’s ‘Other Rankless’ PME Conference before Christmas, display an incredible level of paternalism and a real failure to understand that the educational requirements of the battlespace have changed. Current Army PME, while still delivering an effect, has become, like my exquisite Christmas present, obsolete.
The battlespace has changed fundamentally since the current concept of soldier education was formulated. In those days, the Army was a mass instrument, and soldier education was concerned with ensuring Non-Commissioned Officers could read and write to an adequate level and have an understanding of current affairs. In general, it was expected that his or her officer would be substantially better educated and be there to guide them in barracks and in the field, soldiers’ intellectual efforts should be confined to the techniques of the trade in which he was employed. The soldier was there to do not to think. This sort of Army; hierarchical, paternalistic, and functional, lost its efficacy at the end of the Cold War. As the character of warfare has changed, so have the educational requirements of NCOs; the battlefield is far more precise and lethal than it was, sensing and targeting enforce dispersion, and as a result the soldier must use their initiative to a far greater degree. Initiative is not latent, it is learned through education and training.
In an article for War on the Rocks in November 2018, the author, Matthew Reed quoted from an interview with a former U.S divisional commander and Army War College commandant, Major General Anthony Cucolo, in which the General had stated:
‘When I was commanding U.S Division-North in Iraq, I needed my command sergeant major to operate at that level with me as much as my two one-stars and as much as my chief of staff…Every member of the command group needs to be operating at the same level… You need things like understanding grand strategy, how strategy turns into policy, the economics of warfare, and oral and written communications so you can go toe-to-toe intellectually when you get put in those positions.’
This insight is as prescient at every layer of command; the relevant SNCO or Warrant Officer should be as educated as the officer to whom he answers, indeed all NCOs should have sufficient education to perform the duties of their superiors. This was certainly the aspiration in the German Reichsheer in the 1920s, and was proven effective when the force underwent rapid expansion in the 1930s. Some have accused me of wanting to give soldiers a ‘liberal arts education’, this is categorically not my objective, rather it is to encourage PME at all ranks to enable better decision-making on a lethal and dispersed battlefield whether they want it or not! In conclusion, I, and I’m sure many reading this post, have been in situations in training and on operations where better PME for soldiers could have created a far better outcome, I’d like to see those who come after me better educated to deal with the battlefield of today, and learn from the mistakes of the past. It is January, what better time to look back on the past and set your compass to the future!
PME – its not an Officer sport.
All the very best in 2019,